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Achievable Rates for the General Gaussian Multiple Access
Wire-Tap Channel with Collective Secrecy
Ender Tekin and Aylin Yener
Abstract— We consider the General Gaussian Multi-
ple Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT). In this
scenario, multiple users communicate with an intended
receiver in the presence of an intelligent and informed
eavesdropper who is as capable as the intended receiver,
but has different channel parameters. We aim to provide
perfect secrecy for the transmitters in this multi-access
environment. Using Gaussian codebooks, an achievable
secrecy region is determined and the power allocation
that maximizes the achievable sum-rate is found. Numeri-
cal results showing the new rate region are presented. It is
shown that the multiple-access nature of the channel may
be utilized to allow users with zero single-user secrecy
capacity to be able to transmit in perfect secrecy. In
addition, a new collaborative scheme is shown that may
increase the achievable sum-rate. In this scheme, a user
who would not transmit to maximize the sum rate can
help another user who (i) has positive secrecy capacity
to increase its rate, or (ii) has zero secrecy capacity to
achieve a positive secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wire-tap channel was first analyzed by Wyner
in [1], where a wire-tapper has access to a degraded
version of the intended receiver’s signal in a single-user
communications scenario. He measured the amount
of “secrecy” using the conditional entropy of the
transmitted message given the received signal at the
wire-tapper, and determined the region of all possible
Rate/Wiretapper Equivocation pairs. Wyner showed the
existence of a secrecy capacity, Cs, for communication
below which it is possible to transmit zero information
to the wire-tapper. Carleial and Hellman, in [2], showed
that it is possible to transmit several low-rate messages
at perfect secrecy to achieve an overall rate closer to
capacity. In [3], the authors extended Wyner’s results
to Gaussian channels and also showed that Carleial and
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Hellman’s results hold for Gaussian channels as well.
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner, in [4], showed that Wyner’s results
can be extended to weaker, so called “less noisy” and
“more capable” channels. Furthermore, they analyzed
the more general case of sending common information
to both the receiver and the wire-tapper.
More recently, the notion of the wire-tap channel was
extended to parallel channels, [5], [6], relay channels,
[7], and fading channels, [8]. Multiple-access channels
were considered in [9]–[11]. In [9], [10], the wire-
tapper gets a degraded version of a GMAC uplink
signal, and it is shown that the nature of the channel
allows an improvement in the individual achievable
rates over the single-user channel while having the
same limitation on the sum-rate. In [11], there is no
external eavesdropper, but the two transmitters try to
keep their messages secret from each other.
In [9], we considered the Gaussian Multiple Access
Wire-Tap Channel (GMAC-WT) and defined two sepa-
rate secrecy constraints: (i) the individual secrecy con-
straints, the normalized entropy of any set of messages
conditioned on the transmitted codewords of the other
users and the received signal at the wire-tapper, and
(ii) the collective secrecy constraints, the normalized
entropy of any set of messages conditioned on the wire-
tapper’s received signal. The first set of constraints is
more conservative to ensure secrecy of any subset of
users even when the remaining users are compromised.
The second set of constraints ensures the collective
secrecy of any set of users, utilizing the secrecy of
the remaining users. In [9], we considered a scenario
where the wire-tapper received a physically degraded
version of the receiver’s signal and examined the per-
fect secrecy rate regions for both sets of constraints. We
generalized this to a pre-determined level of secrecy,
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, in [10], [12]. In this paper, we utilize the
collective secrecy constraints with perfect secrecy, and
consider the more general case where the eavesdrop-
per’s 1 signal is not necessarily degraded, but is at an
overall disadvantage compared to the receiver, which
we model as a set of received power constraints. Under
these constraints, using random Gaussian codebooks,
we find an achievable secure rate region, where users
can communicate with arbitrarily small probability of
error with the intended receiver under perfect secrecy
from the eavesdropper. For this achievable rate region,
we find the transmit powers that maximize the sum
rate. We also find the sum-rate maximizing power
allocation, and users with “good” channels - those with
standardized channel gains below a certain threshold -
transmit with maximum power, and those with “bad”
channels, below this threshold, do not transmit. Next,
we show that a non-transmitting user can help increase
the secrecy capacity for a transmitting user by ef-
fectively “jamming” the eavesdropper, or even enable
secret communications that would not be possible in a
single-user scenario. We term this scheme collaborative
secrecy.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider K users communicating with a receiver
in the presence of an eavesdropper. Transmitter k =
1, . . . ,K chooses a message Wk from a set of equally
likely messages Wk = {1, . . . ,Mk}. The messages are
encoded using (2nRk , n) codes into {X˜nk (Wk)}, where
Rk =
1
n
log2Mk. The encoded messages {X˜k} =
{X˜nk } are then transmitted, and the intended receiver
and the eavesdropper each get a copy Y = Y n and
Z = Zn. The receiver decodes Y to get an estimate
of the transmitted messages, Wˆ. We would like to
communicate with the receiver with arbitrarily low
probability of error, while maintaining perfect secrecy,
the exact definition of which will be made precise
shortly.
The signals at the intended receiver and the eaves-
dropper are given by
Y =
∑K
k=1
√
h(M)k X˜k + N˜
(M) (1)
Z =
∑K
k=1
√
h(W)k X˜k + N˜
(W) (2)
where N˜(M), N˜(W) are the AWGN, i.e., N˜(M) ∼
N (0, σ2
M
I
)
and N˜(W) ∼ N (0, σ2
W
I
)
. We also assume
1Henceforth, we will refer to the adversary as the eavesdropper
rather than the wire-tapper since the communication situation mod-
eled is a more general model that is more appropriate for wireless
communications
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Fig. 1. Equivalent General Gaussian Multiple-Access Wire-
Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT) system model.
the following transmit power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
X˜2ki ≤ P˜k,max, k = 1, . . . ,K (3)
Similar to the scaling transformation to put an
interference channel in standard form, [13], we can
represent any GMAC-WT by an equivalent standard
form as in [12]:
Y =
∑K
k=1Xk +N
(M) (4a)
Z =
∑K
k=1
√
hkXk +N
(W) (4b)
where
• the original codewords {X˜} are scaled to get
Xk =
√
h
(M)
k
σ2
M
X˜k.
• The eavesdropper’s new channel gains are given
by hk = h
(W)
k
σ2
M
h
(M)
k σ
2
W
.
• The noise vectors are normalized such that N(M) =
1
σ2
M
N˜(M) and N(W) = 1
σ2
W
N˜(W).
In [9], we examined the special case of the eaves-
dropper getting a degraded version of the received
signal, which is equivalent to h1 = h2 = . . . = hK ≡
h < 1. In this paper, we look at the more general
case where this is not necessarily true. The model is
illustrated in Figure 1.
We use the collective secrecy constraints defined in
[9] to take into account the multi-access nature of the
channel.
∆
(C)
S ,
H(WS |Z)
H(WS)
∀S ⊆ K , {1, . . . ,K} (5)
We constrain each subset of users to maintain perfect
secrecy, i.e. ∆(C)S ≥ 1 − ǫ for all sets S such that
H(WS) > 0. Since this must be true for all sets
of users, collectively the system has perfect secrecy.
However, if a group of users are somehow compro-
mised, the remaining users may also be vulnerable.
Note that providing ∆(C)K ≥ 1 − ǫr , where r ≥∑K
k=1Rk/mink:Rk>0Rk guarantees the perfect secrecy
of all subsets as seen by the following argument:
H(WK|Z) ≥ H(WK)− ǫ
r
H(WK) (6)
H(WS |Z) ≥ H(WS) +H(WSc |WS)
−H(WSc |WS ,Z)− ǫ
r
H(WK)
(7)
≥ H(WS)− ǫ
r
H(WK) (8)
H(WS |Z)
H(WS)
≥ 1− H(WK)
H(WS)
ǫ
r
(9)
∆
(C)
S ≥ 1− ǫ (10)
Definition 1 (Achievable rates). The rate vector R =
(R1, . . . , RK) is said to be achievable with perfect
secrecy if for any given ǫ > 0 there exists a code of
sufficient length n such that
1
n
log2Mk ≥ Rk − ǫ k = 1, . . . ,K (11)
Pe ≤ ǫ (12)
∆
(C)
S ≥ 1− ǫ ∀S ⊆ K = {1, . . . ,K} (13)
where user k chooses one of Mk symbols to transmit
according to the uniform distribution and
Pe =
1∏K
k=1Mk
∑
W∈W1×W2×···×WK
Pr{Wˆ 6= W|W was sent}.
(14)
is the average probability of error. We will denote the
set of all achievable rates with perfect secrecy Cs.
Before we state our results, we define the following
quantities for any S ⊆ K.
C (M)S , g
(∑
k∈SPk
)
, C (W)S , g
(∑
k∈ShkPk
)
C˜ (M)S , g
( ∑
k∈SPk
1 +
∑
k∈ScPk
)
C˜ (W)S , g
( ∑
k∈ShkPk
1 +
∑
k∈SchkPk
)
where g(ξ) , 12 log(1 + ξ) and Sc = K \ S . The
quantities with S = K will sometimes also be used
with the subscript sum. Note that these quantities are
functions of {Pk}Kk=1. We also define the following set
of allowable powers such that C (M)S ≥ C˜ (W)S :
P ,
{
P = (P1, . . . , PK) :
Pk,max ≥ Pk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K,
φS(P) ≥ 0 ∀S ⊆ K
}
(15)
where
φS(P) ,
∑
k∈S
Pk −
∑
k∈S hkPk
1 +
∑
k∈Sc hkPk
(16)
Note that if hk ≤ 1∀k, we are left with P ≡
{P : Pk,max ≥ Pk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K}. On the other
hand, if hk > 1, ∀k, then the constraint for set K forces
Pk = 0, ∀k.
III. ACHIEVABLE RATES
Here, we present an achievable region using Gaus-
sian codebooks. The proof is very similar to the proof
of the achievable region presented in [10]. Note that,
when h1 = . . . = hK < 1, the region reduces to the
special case examined in [9], [10], [12].
Theorem 1. We can transmit with perfect secrecy us-
ing Gaussian codebooks at rates satisfying∑
k∈SRk ≤ C (M)S − C˜ (W)S ∀S ⊆ K (17)
where P ∈ P. The region containing all R satisfying
these equations is denoted G¯s.
Proof: Let R = (R1, . . . , RK) satisfy (17). For
user k ∈ K, consider the scheme:
1) Let Mk = 2n(Rk−ǫ′) where 0 ≤ ǫ′ < ǫ where ǫ′
is chosen to ensure that Mk is an integer.
2) Generate 2 codebooks Xk and Xkx. Xk consists
of Mk codewords, each component of which is
drawn ∼ N (0, λkPk − ε). Codebook Xkx has
Mkx codewords with each component randomly
drawn ∼ N (0, (1 − λk)Pk − ε) where ε is arbi-
trarily small to ensure that the power constraints
on the codewords are satisfied with high prob-
ability. Define Rkx = 1n logMkx and Mkt =
MkMkx. Then Rkt = 1n logMkt = Rk+Rkx+ǫ
′
.
3) To transmit message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk}, user k
finds the codeword corresponding to Wk in Xk
and also uniformly chooses a codeword from Xkx
which are then added and the resulting codeword,
Xk, is sent so that we are actually transmitting
one of Mkt codewords.
The specific rates are chosen such that ∀S ⊆ K the
following are satisfied:∑
k∈SRk ≤ C (M)S − C˜ (W)S (18)∑K
k=1Rkx = C
(W)
sum (19)∑
k∈SRkt ≤ C (M)S (20)
From (20) and the GMAC coding theorem, with high
probability the receiver can decode the codewords with
low probability of error. We now need to show that
the secrecy constraints are satisfied. Note that since
the secrecy of the overall system ensures the secrecy
of each subset, we only need to show that the coding
scheme described achieves ∆K ≥ 1 − ǫ. We concern
ourselves only with MAC sub-code {Xk}Kk=1. From
this point of view, the coding scheme described is
equivalent to each user k ∈ K selecting one of Mk
messages, and sending a uniformly chosen codeword
from among Mkx codewords for each. Define XΣ =∑K
k=1
√
hkXk.
H(WK|Z) (21)
= H(WK,Z)−H(Z) (22)
= H(WK,XΣ,Z)−H(XΣ|WK,Z)−H(Z) (23)
= H(WK) +H(Z|WK,XΣ)−H(Z)
+H(XΣ|WK)−H(XΣ|WK,Z) (24)
= H(WK)− I(XΣ;Z) + I(XΣ;Z|WK) (25)
where we used WK → XΣ → Z⇒ H(Z|WK,XΣ) =
H(Z|XΣ) to get (25). We will consider the two terms
individually. First, we have the trivial bound due to
channel capacity:
I(XΣ;Z) ≤ nC (W)sum (26)
Now write
I(XΣ;Z|WK) = H(XΣ|WK)−H(XΣ|WK,Z)
(27)
Since user k sends one of Mkx codewords for each
message,
H(XΣ|WK) = log (M1xM2x) (28)
= n (R1x +R2x) = nC
(W)
sum (29)
We can also write
H(XΣ|WK,Z) ≤ nξn (30)
where ξn → 0 as n→∞ since, with high probability,
the eavesdropper can decode XΣ given WK due to
(19). Note that the individual rates are unimportant -
as far as the eavesdropper is concerned, it is receiving
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Fig. 2. Achievable rate region for h1 = .1, h2 =
.2, P1,max = 10, P2,max = 10
one of nC (W)sum codewords with equal probability for
each (W1,W2) pair. Using (18), (19), (26), (29) and
(30) in (25), we get
H(WK|Z) ≥ H(WK)− nC (W)sum + nC (W)sum − nξn
(31)
= H(WK)− nξn (32)
and dividing both sides by H(WK) gives
∆
(C)
K ≥ 1−
ξn∑K
k=1Rk
(33)
completing the proof. An intuitive way of looking at
this is as “capacity stuffing with superfluous informa-
tion”. For each message pair, the eavesdropper can
decode the extra “sum-codeword” transmitted if it knew
which messages were sent, but since this information
arrives at its capacity, it cannot gain any information
about the actual transmitted messages. For a single-user
system consisting of user k, if hk ≥ 1, then the secrecy
capacity for that user would have been 0. However, the
multi-access nature of the channel enables a different
user j with hj < 1 to “help” such a user achieve a
non-zero rate with perfect secrecy.
IV. MAXIMIZATION OF SUM RATE
The achievable region given in Theorem 1 depends
on the transmit powers. We are naturally interested
in the power allocation P∗ = (P ∗1 , . . . , P ∗K) that
would maximize the total throughput, i.e. the sum rate.
However, the sum rate maximization is a non-trivial
problem since the powers have to be constrained to P.
WLOG, assume that the users are ordered such that
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Fig. 3. Achievable rate region for h1 = .1, h2 =
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h1 ≤ h2 ≤ . . . ≤ hK .
max
P∈P
C (M)sum − C (W)sum (34)
= max
P∈P
g
(
K∑
k=1
Pk
)
− g
(
K∑
k=1
hkPk
)
(35)
= min
P∈P
1
2
log ρ(P) (36)
≡ min
P∈P
ρ(P) (37)
where we used the monotonicity of the log function
and
ρ(P) ,
1 +
∑K
k=1 hkPk
1 +
∑K
k=1 Pk
(38)
We start with writing the Lagrangian to be minimized,
L(P,µ) = ρ(P)−
K∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
K∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk −Pk,max)
−
∑
S⊆K
µ3SφS(P) (39)
Equating the derivative of the Lagrangian to zero, we
get
∂L(P,µ)
∂Pj
= ρ˙(j)(P)− µ1j + µ2j
−
∑
S⊆K
µ3S φ˙
(j)
S (P) = 0 (40)
where
ρ˙(j)(P) ,
∂ρ(P)
∂Pj
=
hj − ρ(P)
1 +
∑K
k=1 Pk
(41)
φ˙
(j)
S (P) ,
∂φS(P)
∂Pj
=


1− hj1+P
k∈Sc
hkPk
, if j ∈ S
hj
P
k∈S
hkPk
(1+
P
k∈Sc
hkPk)
2 , if j 6∈ S (42)
We begin with the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Let P∗ be the optimum power allocation.
For a user k ∈ K, if hk ≥ 1, then P ∗k = 0.
Proof: Assume this statement is wrong, i.e., let
T = {k ∈ K : hk ≥ 1, P ∗k > 0} 6= ∅. Consider Q such
that Qk = P ∗k , k 6∈ T and Qk = 0, k ∈ T . In other
words, for a user k, Qk = P ∗k if hk < 1 and Qk = 0
if hk ≥ 1. We first check to see whether Q ∈ P.
Since P∗ ∈ P, Pmax  Q  0, so we only need to
check if φS(Q) ≥ 0 ∀S .
φS(Q) =
∑
j∈S
Qj −
∑
j∈S hjQj
1 +
∑
j∈Sc hjQj
(43)
=
∑
j∈S−T
Qj +
∑
j∈S∩T
Qj
−
∑
j∈S−T hjQj +
∑
j∈S∩T hjQj
1 +
∑
j∈Sc hjQj
(44)
=
∑
j∈S−T
P ∗j −
∑
j∈S−T hjP
∗
j
1 +
∑
j∈Sc hjQj
(45)
≥
∑
j∈S−T
P ∗j −
∑
j∈S−T
hjP
∗
j (46)
≥ 0 (47)
since all users k ∈ S − T must have hk < 1. The
proof will be complete if we can show that this new
power allocation also increases the sum rate achieved,
or equivalently decreases ρ. Begin by writing
ρ(Q) =
1 +
∑K
k=1 hkQk
1 +
∑K
k=1Qk
(48)
=
1 +
∑
k∈T hkQk +
∑
k∈T c hkQk
1 +
∑
k∈T Qk +
∑
k∈T c Qk
(49)
=
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c P
∗
k
(50)
≤ 1 +
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k +
∑
k∈T hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c P
∗
k +
∑
k∈T P
∗
k
(51)
= ρ(P∗) (52)
where we have used a
b
≤ a+c
b+d if
a
b
≤ 1 and c
d
≥ 1
when a, b, c, d ≥ 0.
This lemma basically states that to maximize the sum-
rate, any user who has a better or equivalent eavesdrop-
per channel must cease transmission. Now, we look
at the optimum power allocation among the remaining
users. This is stated in the below lemma:
Theorem 3. The optimum power allocation P∗ satis-
fies P ∗k = Pk,max for k = 1, . . . , l and P ∗k = 0 for
k = l + 1, . . . ,K where l is some limiting user such
that
hl <
1 +
∑l
k=1 hkPk,max
1 +
∑l
k=1 Pk,max
≤ hl+1 (53)
Proof: From Lemma 2, we see that if hk ≥ 1,
then P ∗k = 0 for all k ∈ S . Thus, we have φS(P∗) ≥ 0
with equality if and only if P ∗k = 0 for all k ∈ S .
Then, from the supplementary conditions, we must
have µ3S = 0 for all S containing a transmitting
user, and
∑
k∈S P
∗
k = 0 for all S not containing a
transmitting user. As a result, µ3S φ˙(j)S (P∗) = 0, ∀S ⊆
K. Then, it is easy to see that P ∗j = Pj,max if hj <
ρ(P∗) and P ∗j = 0 if hj > ρ(P∗). A user j may
have 0 < P ∗j < Pj,max iff hj = ρ(P∗). However,
then the sum rate is independent of that user’s power,
so we could set P ∗j = 0 without any loss in sum rate
achievable, and conserve power. The next step is to find
this limiting user l. It is easy to see that this user must
satisfy (53), and can be found in at most K steps.
V. SECRECY THROUGH COLLABORATION
In the previous section, we showed that the sum
secrecy rate is maximized when users with hk ≥ 1
do not transmit. An interesting question in this case,
is whether such a user can somehow help increase the
secrecy capacity for another user that has hk < 1 and
is transmitting at full power. We will show that this is
possible in some cases, namely by using the fact that
a user with hk ≥ 1 can have a ‘more adverse’ effect
on the eavesdropper than on the intended receiver. We
will consider the two-user scenario and examine two
cases:
A. h1 < 1 ≤ h2
Consider the same case examined in the previous
section: h1 < 1 ≤ h2. The sum-rate achievable with
perfect secrecy was shown to be Cs = g(P1,max) −
g(h1P1,max) with P1 = P1,max, P2 = 0. User 2, rather
than sit idle, can help user 1 by generating white noise
and sending this across the channel. This will create
additional noise at the intended receiver, but even more
additional noise at the eavesdropper’s receiver. Since
the secrecy capacity in the now single-user channel is
known to be the difference of the channel capacities,
this scheme may increase the secrecy capacity by
reducing the eavesdropper’s channel capacity more than
it does the intended receiver’s. The problem at hand can
be written as:
max
(P1,P2)
g
(
P1
1 + P2
)
− g
(
h1P1
1 + h2P2
)
s. t. 0 ≤ P1 ≤ P1,max, 0 ≤ P2 ≤ P2,max (54)
Start by writing the Lagrangian using the monotonicity
of log:
L(P,µ) = − (1 + P1 + P2)(1 + h2P2)
(1 + P2)(1 + h1P1 + h2P2)
−
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − Pk,max) (55)
Consider user 1:
∂L(P,µ)
∂P1
=
Ψ1(P2)
(1 + P2)(1 + h1P1 + h2P2)2
− µ11 + µ21 = 0 (56)
where
Ψ1(P2) = −(1 + h2P2)[(1− h1) + (h2 − h1)P2] (57)
Ψ1(P2) is always negative due to h1 < 1 ≤ h2.
Hence, we must have µ21 > 0 ⇒ P1 = P1,max. Now
examine user 2:
∂L(P,µ)
∂P2
=
Ψ2(P1, P2)
(1 + P2)2(1 + h1P1 + h2P2)2
− µ21 + µ22 = 0 (58)
where
Ψ2(P1, P2) = P1h2(h2 − h1)(P2 − p(1))(P2 − p(2))
(59)
p(1) =
−h2(1− h1) +
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) , (60)
p(2) =
−h2(1− h1)−
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) , (61)
D = h1h2[(h2 − 1) + (h2 − h1)P1)](h2 − 1) (62)
We already know that P1 = P1,max. Note that if
Ψ2(P1,max, P2) > 0, then we must have µ21 > 0 ⇒
P2 = 0. On the other hand, if Ψ2(P1,max, P2) <
0, then µ22 > 0 ⇒ P2 = P2,max. Only when
Ψ2(P1,max, P2) = 0 do we have 0 < P2 < P2,max.
It is easy to see that D ≥ (h2 − 1)
√
h1h2 ≥ 0 and
hence p(2) < 0. Ψ2(P1,max, P2) is an upright parabola
with respect to P2 with at least one negative root.
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As a result, if the other root, p(1) is also negative,
then Ψ2(P1,max, P2) > 0 ⇒ P2 = 0. An example
is when h2 = 1 ⇒ p(1) = p(2). If p(1) is positive,
then we have two possibilities, either P2 lies between
the roots, in which case Ψ2(P1,max, P2) < 0 ⇒ P2 =
P2,max, or P2 ≥ p(1). Since the latter would imply
Ψ2(P1,max, P2) > 0 and hence P2 = 0, it is not
possible. Thus, the optimal solution is
P1 = P1,max, P2 =


0, if p(1) ≤ 0
p(1), if 0 < p(1) ≤ P2,max
P2,max, if p(1) > P2,max
(63)
The condition to have p(1) ≤ 0 is equivalent to
P1,max ≤ 1−h1h2h1(h2−h1) . Note that if h1h2 ≥ 1, regardless
of P1,max, user 2 can always help increase the secrecy
capacity.
B. 1 ≤ h1 < h2
Now consider the case where neither user could
transmit in the region given in Section 3. We are
motivated by the previous result to see whether user
2 can actually make it possible for user 1 to transmit
with perfect secrecy. Our optimization problem and the
Lagrangian are the same as given in (54) and (55). This
time Ψ1(P2) has a single root with P2 ≥ 0, and is not
necessarily negative. Depending on its value, we will
have different optimum P1 values. Thus,
(i)) P2 < h1−1h2−h1 ⇒ Ψ1(P2) > 0⇒ µ11 > 0⇒ P1 =
0.
(ii)) P2 = h1−1h2−h1 ⇒ Ψ1(P2) = 0⇒ µ11 = µ21 = 0.
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(iii)) P2 > h1−1h2−h1 ⇒ Ψ1(P2) < 0⇒ µ21 > 0⇒ P1 =
P1,max.
Now look at user 2. Again, D > 0 and Ψ2(P1, P2) is
an upright parabola of P2. However, this time we are
guaranteed a positive root as p(1) > 0, and the solution
for P2 depends on p(2). Consider each of the above
cases: In (i) and (ii), Cs = 0 regardless of P1, so we
are not interested in P2. Consider case (iii): We then
have P2 > p(2). If P2 < p(1), then Ψ2(P1, P2) < 0,
and P2 = P2,max. If P2 ≥ p(1), then Ψ2(P1, P2) ≥ 0.
Since we cannot have µ21 > 0 at the same time, the
only solution is P2 = p(1). Summarizing, we get
P =


(0, 0), if P2,max ≤ h1−1h2−h1
(P1,max, P2,max), if h1−1h2−h1 < P2,max ≤ p(1)
(P1,max, p
(1)), if P2,max > p(1)
(64)
Note that the solution is of the same form as the
previous case. As long as user 2 has enough power
to make user 1’s effective channel better than the
eavesdropper’s, user 1 can transmit at full power as
in the previous setting. User 1 could also have helped
user 2, but it is better for the “worse” user to help the
“better” user to maximize the sum rate.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we found an achievable rate region
for the General Gaussian Multiple-Access Wire-Tap
Channel (GGMAC-WT), in which a second wireless
receiver is eavesdropping on the uplink of a GMAC. We
also showed that the sum-rate is maximized when only
users with “better” channels to the intended receiver as
opposed to the eavesdropper transmit, and they do so
using all their available power. Moreover we have ex-
plored the possibility of the users with worse channels
to the intended receiver helping the transmitting users
by jamming. This scheme, which we term collaborative
secrecy, is analyzed for the two user case.
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